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IS KELLY SHIFTING UNDER GOOGLE’S FEET?  
NEW NINTH CIRCUIT IMPACT ON THE 
GOOGLE LIBRARY PROJECT LITIGATION 
CAMERON W. WESTIN1  
ABSTRACT 
The Google Library Project presents what many consider to be 
the perfect fair-use problem.  The legal debate surrounding the 
Library Project has centered on the Ninth Circuit’s Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft.  Yet recent case law presents new arguments for both sides of 
the Library Project litigation.  This iBrief analyzes two Ninth 
Circuit district court decisions on fair use, Field v. Google, Inc. 
and Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., and their impact on the Library 
Project litigation. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The Google Library Project has generated mountains of academic 
papers and presents numerous complex legal and pragmatic issues.  The 
project involves scanning and making available online “snippets” of literary 
works protected by copyright.2  On both sides, much of the debate focuses 
on Kelly v. Arriba Soft  (“Kelly II”),3 a 2003 Ninth Circuit case that held the 
display of thumbnail images in an Internet search engine to be a fair use.  
However, two recent fair-use analyses by the Ninth Circuit’s district courts 
regarding various aspects of Google’s search engine technology may refine 
and alter the impact of this precedent.  In Field v. Google, Inc.,4 the district 
court for the District of Nevada ruled Google’s storage and display of 
websites from cache memory was a fair use.  In Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc.,5 
the district court for the Central District of California held Google’s Image 
Search, a search engine very similar to that in Kelly II, was likely not a fair 
use.  These recent fair-use applications include considerations beyond those 
of the Kelly II court that also warrant attention in the Google Library Project 
litigation. 
¶2 Part I of this iBrief will provide a brief overview of Google Book 
Search, including the litigation surrounding the Library Project currently 
                                                     
1 Duke University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2007; University of Miami, 
B.S. in Electrical (Audio) Engineering, 2004. 
2 See infra Part I.A. 
3 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
4 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
5 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
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pending in the Southern District of New York.  Part II of this iBrief will 
discuss the fair-use provision of the Copyright Act and the likelihood that 
the Southern District of New York will follow the Ninth Circuit’s precedent 
in the area.  Part III examines the Ninth Circuit’s Kelly II decision and its 
applicability to Google’s case, and also details the technology and fair-use 
analyses of the Field and Perfect 10 courts.  Part IV asserts that the 
additional considerations of these district courts should apply in a fair-use 
analysis of the Library Project and develops the arguments and implications 
Field and Perfect 10 may have on the Library Project litigation. 
I. GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH AND THE DEBATE THUS FAR 
A. Google Book Search 
¶3 On December 14, 2004, Google Inc. announced the ambitious 
“Google Book Search” program (previously “Google Print”), indicating the 
intent of the online search engine leader to scan materials from five major 
libraries and make the resources searchable online.6  The project involves 
two separate programs, the “Partner Program” (formerly the “Publisher 
Program”) and the “Library Project.” 
¶4 Under the Partner Program, with the content owner’s authorization, 
Google scans the full text of a book currently under copyright protection 
into its search database.7  The database then responds to user queries by 
providing several pages of the book surrounding the relevant inquiry, as 
well as links to purchase the book from established online bookstores or 
directly from the publisher’s website.8  Recently, Google announced it 
would also enter the book sales market, inviting U.S. and British publishers 
and authors to sell online access to browser-based copies of their books.9  
The Partner Program has not produced the legal turmoil of the Library 
Project because it is conducted cooperatively with content owners and 
similar to other competitive programs.10   
¶5 The controversial Library Project entails Google scanning 
materials, regardless of copyright status, from the libraries of the University 
                                                     
6 Press Release, Google, Google Checks Out Library Books (Dec. 14, 2004), 
http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/print_library.html.  
7 Google Partner Program, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/publisher.html 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
8 Id. 
9 Anne Broache, Google To Broker Online Book Sales, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 
13, 2006, http://news.com.com/2102-1025_3-6049002.html.  
10 See, e.g., Elinor Mills, Microsoft to Offer Book Search, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Oct. 26, 2005, http://news.com.com/2102-1025_3-5913711.html.  
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of California,11 Harvard University, Stanford University, Oxford 
University, the University of Michigan, and the New York Public Library.12  
Google saves the scanned copy of the materials on its search database.13 
¶6 In response to user queries, the displayed result depends upon the 
copyright status of the book.  The full texts of relevant public domain 
materials are displayed.  However, if the book is still under copyright, only 
a few sentences surrounding the search term, what Google defines as a 
“snippet,” is displayed.14  Google Book Search limits the amount of 
snippets displayed per book to each user and does not display any snippets 
from certain reference books, whose purpose may be obviated by public 
availability of even a snippet.15  Alongside search results is information for 
purchasing the book, as well as the nearest available public library copy.16  
No advertising is displayed with the results.17  Google also provides digital 
versions of the works to the respective library from which the copies are 
scanned.18 
¶7 Both the Association of American Publishers (“AAP”) and the 
Authors Guild (“AG”) responded with heavy criticism and expressed doubt 
regarding the legality of the Library Project.19  In response, Google 
announced it would suspend copying until November 2005 to provide for 
the implementation of an “opt-out” program, through which the owner to 
the rights of a protected work can instruct that the book not be included in 
the Library Project.20  Thus, as Professor Jonathan Band explains, Google 
                                                     
11 Press Release, University of California Office of the President, UC Libraries 
Partner with Google to Digitize Books (Aug. 9, 2006), 
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/2006/aug09.html.  
12 Google Library Partners, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/partners.html 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2007).   
13 JONATHAN BAND, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, OFFICE FOR INFO. TECH. POLICY, THE 
GOOGLE LIBRARY PROJECT:  THE COPYRIGHT DEBATE 2 (2006), available at 
www.policybandwidth.com/doc/googlepaper.pdf.  
14 Google Book Search Common Questions, 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/common.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
15 BAND, supra note 13, at 1-2. 
16 About Google Book Search, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/about.html 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
17 Common Questions, supra note 14. 
18 ROBIN JEWELER, CONG. RES. SERVICE, REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE GOOGLE 
BOOK SEARCH PROJECT:  IS ONLINE INDEXING A FAIR USE UNDER COPYRIGHT 
LAW? 2 (2005), available at http://opencrs.com/rpts/RS22356_20051228.pdf.  
19 Burt Helm, A Google Project Pains Publishers, BUS. WK. ONLINE, May 23, 
2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2005/tc20050523_9472_
tc024.htm. 
20 BAND, supra note 13, at 2. 
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provides a copyright owner with three choices with respect to any particular 
work: 
[T]he owner can participate in the Partner Program, in which case it 
would share in revenue derived from the display of pages from the 
work in response to user queries; it can let Google scan the book under 
the Library Project and display snippets in response to user queries; or 
it can opt-out of the Library Project, in which case Google will not 
scan its book.21
¶8 Other online giants are involved in similar endeavors, although in 
less controversial manners.  Rivals Yahoo and Microsoft MSN are working 
with the Internet Archive on a competing book digitization project, which 
will only scan public domain works or works authorized by the copyright 
owners.22  Public domain works have been available online for years 
through Project Gutenberg.23  In November of 2005, Amazon.com 
announced it would sell online books through a search program similar to 
Yahoo’s, and Random House, the world’s largest publisher of trade books, 
claimed it had a business plan for allowing similar online viewing.24  Yet 
Google’s scanning of copyrighted content without permission stands alone, 
as these other programs only scan public domain works or follow an “opt-
in” model for copyrighted works. 
B. Litigation 
¶9 Google suspended copying from August until November 1, 2005, to 
allow for content owners to exercise their opt-out privileges.25  However, 
alleging a “plain and brazen violation of copyright law,” the AG filed suit 
against Google for copyright infringement in September of 2005.26  Five 
major publishing companies, members of the AAP, quickly followed suit 
the next month.27  Both suits were filed in the District Court for the 
                                                     
21 Id. 
22 Mills, supra note 10. 
23 Available online at www.gutenberg.org.  
24 Elinor Mills, Amazon, Random House Throw Book at Google, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Nov. 3, 2005, http://news.com.com/2102-1025_3-5931569.html.  
25 BAND, supra note 13, at 2. 
26 Press Release, Authors Guild, Authors Guild Sues Google, Citing Massive 
Copyright Infringement (Sept. 20, 2005), 
http://www.authorsguild.org/news/sues_google_citing.htm.  
27 Press Release, Association of American Publishers, Publishers Sue Google 
Over Plan to Digitize Books (Oct. 19, 2005), 
http://publishers.org/press/releases.cfm?PressReleaseArticleID=292.  
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Southern District of New York.28  Google responded that its Library Project 
was “fully consistent with both the fair use doctrine . . . and the principles 
underlying copyright law itself.”29 
II. SECTION 107 AND THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
¶10 “From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for 
fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill 
copyright's very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts . . . .’”30  Usage of a copyrighted work that would otherwise infringe 
the copyright holder’s exclusive rights is not an infringement if it is 
determined to be a fair use.31  Section 107 of the Copyright Act dictates 
four non-exclusive factors to be considered in fair use analysis on a case-by-
case basis.  These are:  (1) the purpose and character of the use (including if 
it is commercial in nature or a “transformative” use); (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount of the work used; and (4) the effects or 
potential effects on the market for the original work.32  While the statutory 
law requires all four factors be considered in fair-use determinations, the 
first and fourth factors have been identified as the most important33 and 
have received the greatest consideration in Kelly II and its progeny. 
¶11 Before addressing the Ninth Circuit’s interpretations of the fair-use 
statute, it is worthwhile to evaluate the likelihood that the Southern District 
of New York would look to the Ninth Circuit’s non-binding precedent for 
guidance.  As discussed below,34 the facts and legal analysis of the Kelly II 
decision provide compelling analogies to the Library Project litigation.   
¶12 Despite these parallels, Professor Richard Epstein has noted the 
differing interests of East and West Coast industries and the influence this 
may have on their respective circuits’ viewpoints: 
                                                     
28 Complaint, McGraw Hill Comp., Inc. et al. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8881 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 19, 2005); Complaint, The Authors Guild, et al. v. Google, 
Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20, 2005). 
29 Official Google Blog, “Google Print and the Authors Guild,” 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/google-print-and-authors-guild.html 
(Sept. 20, 2005, 21:04 EST). 
30 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.  510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. 
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8).   
31 18 C.J.S. Copyrights § 45 (2006). 
32 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
579, 590 (1994). 
33 Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 2006). 
34 See, infra, Part III.A (discussing facts and legal analysis of decision) and Part 
IV.A (briefly applying precedent); see also BAND, supra note 13, at 5-9.  
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The East Coast is the home of authors and publishers.  Content is king 
so that its protection becomes a powerful institutional interest.  The 
West Coast is the home of the persons who distribute content, like 
Google, not those who create it.  Hence there the natural bias is in 
favor of allowing the free flow of information that any assertion of 
intellectual property rights could disrupt.35
¶13 While Google may be up against “the publishers’ and authors’ 
home court advantage,”36 other circuits have seen fit to follow Ninth Circuit 
precedent in pragmatic Internet-related copyright issues.37  Kelly II has been 
cited in various fair-use analyses of district courts in other circuits, 
including in the Southern District of New York38 and is prevalent in the 
commentary, press releases, and academic debate surrounding the Library 
Project.39  
III. KELLY II PRECEDENT AND NEW NINTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS  
¶14 While fair use is an “equitable rule of reason” that must be assessed 
“on a case-by-case basis,”40 many commentators have looked to a 2003 
Ninth Circuit opinion, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. (“Kelly II”),41 a seminal 
                                                     
35 Posting of Professor Richard Epstein to Duke Law and Technology Review – 
iBlawg, “The Google Library Project:  When East Doesn’t Meet West,” 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/iblawg/?p=23 (Feb. 22, 2006). 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 548-55 (4th Cir. 
2004) (strongly endorsing the Northern District of California’s holding in 
Religious Tech. Cent. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n. Serv’s. Inc., 907 F. Supp. 
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) regarding requirement of a volitional or causational 
element in Internet service-provider liability, and finding that it had been 
codified in the Digital Millenium Copyright Act’s safe harbor provisions, id. at 
1369-70). 
38 See Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 294 F. Supp. 2d 523, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), rev’d on other grounds, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the use of 
photographs featured on magazine covers, when reproduced into an advertising 
poster which was essentially a “photo montage,” to be transformative); see also, 
Bill Graham Archives, LLC. v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 324, 
333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding, under the fourth Section 107 factor, the use of 
reduced-size images of concert posters in a documentary book, for which a 
licensing market did exist, still did not satisfy market harm when use was 
transformative and lower resolution, could not supplant the original, and for a 
fundamentally different purpose). 
39 See generally, BAND, supra note 13; JEWELER, supra note 18, at 4-5; 
Elisabeth Hanratty, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 10 (2005). 
40 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31 
(1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976)). 
41 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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case involving “the application of copyright law to the vast world of the 
[I]nternet and [I]nternet search engines.”42   
¶15 A pair of 2006 decisions in the district courts of the Ninth Circuit, 
in which Google itself was the defendant, may affect Kelly II’s impact on 
the Google Library Project litigation.  In January, the District Court for the 
District of Nevada held in Field v. Google Inc. (“Field”)43 that Google’s 
online storage and display of cached websites was a fair use.44  The next 
month, in Perfect 10 v. Google Inc. (“Perfect 10”),45 based on facts only 
slightly different from those in Kelly II, the District Court for the Central 
District of California found that Google’s creation and public display of 
thumbnails likely did infringe the plaintiff’s copyright protection and did 
not constitute fair use, “despite the enormous public benefit search engines 
such as Google provide.”46 
A. Kelly v. Arriba Soft (“Kelly II”) 
¶16 In 2003, after withdrawing its prior decision for procedural 
reasons,47 the Ninth Circuit held that Arriba Soft’s Internet search engine, 
which generated thumbnail images in response to user searches, was a fair 
use.48 
                                                     
42 Id. at 815. 
43 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
44 Id. at 1118. 
45 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
46 Id. at 851. 
47 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815.  While Arriba conceded a prima facie case of 
infringement regarding only the thumbnail images, and not as to the in-line 
linked full-size images, the district court addressed both issues.  Id. at 816.  In 
the Ninth Circuit’s initial ruling, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th 
Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Kelly I”), the appellate 
court affirmed summary judgment as to the thumbnail images, but held that in-
line linking constituted a “display” for purposes of the Copyright Act, and 
reversed the district court’s ruling of fair use as to the full-size images.  Id. at 
947-48.  However, the holding regarding in-line linking was subject to heavy 
criticism.  See, e.g., Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus 
Curiae In Support of Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc by 
Defendant-Appellee Ditto.com, Inc. (Formerly Arriba Soft Corp.), Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. CV 99-560).  Kelly I was 
subsequently withdrawn, and, in Kelly II, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that 
generation and display of the thumbnail images was a fair use, while absconding 
on the issue of in-line linking on procedural grounds.  336 F.3d at 815-17. 
48 Id. at 822. 
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1. Arriba Soft’s Thumbnail-Generating Internet Search Engine 
¶17 In Kelly II, Defendant Arriba Soft49 operated an Internet search 
engine that displayed small “thumbnail” images, rather than text, in 
response to a user’s search terms.50  Thumbnail images are reduced-size, 
lower-resolution versions of original pictures displayed on the Internet.51  
Arriba downloaded the full-size original images from the webpage in order 
to create the thumbnails and subsequently deleted the originals after storing 
the thumbnails on Arriba’s server.52  If a user selected a particular 
thumbnail image indexed in the result, the search engine would display the 
full-sized image, surrounded by explanatory text, Arriba-supplied 
advertising, and a link to the original web site.53  The full-sized image was 
incorporated into a display through a process known as “in-line linking,” 
which displayed the image in Arriba’s page directly from the originating 
website without ever copying it onto Arriba’s server.54  The court noted that 
“as a result . . . the user would not realize that the image actually resided on 
another web site.”55 
¶18 When Plaintiff Kelly, a photographer who displayed copyrighted 
images on his own website and licensed his images to others, complained 
about his images being indexed on Arriba’s search engine, Arriba deleted 
links to Kelly’s own website.56  Kelly subsequently sued Arriba for 
copyright infringement stemming from images copied by the Arriba 
software off of licensed third-party websites.57  Arriba moved for summary 
judgment based upon fair use, and the district court found both the 
thumbnails and in-line linking to be fair uses58 under Section 107 of the 
Copyright Act.59 
2. Arriba Soft’s Display of Thumbnail Images Was a Fair Use 
¶19 In Kelly II, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the four statutory fair use 
considerations and determined that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images was a 
fair use.  Regarding the purpose and character of the search engine, the 
                                                     
49 Arriba Soft changed its name to “Ditto.com” during litigation.  Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft Corp. 336 F.3d 811, 815 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Kelly II”).. 
50 Id. at 815. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 815-16. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 816. 
56 Id. at 815-16. 
57 Id. at 815. 
58 Id. at 816-17.   
59 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
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Ninth Circuit held that, although Arriba operated its website for commercial 
purposes and its use of Kelly’s images was commercial, the use was “more 
incidental and less exploitative in nature than more traditional types of 
commercial use.”60  Despite Arriba-placed advertising appearing on the 
search results webpage and in-line linked pages, the court found that 
“Arriba was neither using Kelly’s images to directly promote its web site 
nor trying to profit by selling Kelly’s images,” and instead, “Kelly’s images 
were among thousands of images in Arriba’s search engine database.”61  
The court also found the thumbnail images transformative and held that this 
mitigated the significance of the commercial purposes.62  In fair-use 
analysis, a transformative use is one that rather than “merely supersed[ing] 
the object of the originals. . . serves an entirely different function than [the 
original use, in this case] improving access to information on the Internet 
versus artistic expression.”63  The thumbnails also were not likely to be 
used for aesthetic purposes because of their smaller size and inferior 
resolution.64 
¶20 Also within its discussion of the first fair use factor, the court gave 
weight to the public benefit bestowed by enhanced information-gathering 
techniques on the Internet.65  Analogizing the search engine to comparative 
advertising, the court held that the functional benefit of Arriba’s use 
compared with the “minimal loss of integrity to Kelly’s images” further 
inclined the first Section 107 factor towards fair use.66 
¶21 Under the second statutory factor, the Ninth Circuit determined that 
Kelly’s works were clearly creative in nature.  However, this weighed only 
slightly against fair use, as the works had already been published broadly on 
the Internet by Kelly.67 
¶22 The third factor was neutral.68  Considering the amount of the 
copyrighted work that Arriba used, the court found that, although Arriba 
copied Kelly’s works in their entirety, this wholesale copying was 
reasonable in light of Arriba’s intended use.69  The court noted that if 
                                                     
60 Kelly II, 336 F.3d at 818. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 818-19. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 820. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.; see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 
(1985) (holding that “the author’s right to control the first public appearance of 
his expression weighs against” finding of fair use before first publication). 
68 Kelly II, 336 F.3d at 821. 
69 Id. 
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“Arriba only copied part of the image . . . [it would reduce] the usefulness 
of the visual search engine.”70 
¶23 Finally, under the fourth Section 107 factor, the Ninth Circuit held 
that Arriba’s creation and use of the thumbnails did not harm the 
commercial value of Kelly’s images.71  The court found that Arriba’s 
thumbnail results “would guide users to Kelly’s web site rather than away 
from it,” thus not detracting from selling or advertising on the original 
website.72  While making clear that the inferior quality of a reproduction 
may not always assist an alleged infringer in demonstrating fair use,73 the 
court noted that if a user wanted to view or download a quality image, he 
would have to visit Kelly’s website.74  Further, at the time, Arriba did not 
sell or license its thumbnails to other parties, and no foreseeable market for 
thumbnail-versions of the images existed.75 
¶24 After weighing the four Section 107 fair use factors, the Ninth 
Circuit in Kelly II found that Arriba’s generation and display of thumbnail 
images was a fair use under the Copyright Act, despite its incidental 
commercial purpose and wholesale copying of Kelly’s creative works.76   
B. Field v. Google Inc. 
¶25 In Field, the District Court of Nevada held that Google’s cache 
storage did not create liability for direct copyright infringement because the 
display of cached versions of web pages was fair use.77 
1. Google Web Search 
¶26 Google’s main search engine78 scans the web using an automated 
search tool commonly known as a “web crawler.”79  The web crawler 
continuously scans available pages on the Internet and catalogs those pages 
into Google’s searchable web index.80  As a part of this process, Google 
also stores the website’s source code in a temporary repository on its 
servers, known as a “cache.”81  When Google’s search engine runs a text 
                                                     
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 821-22. 
72 Id. at 821. 
73 Id. at 821 n.37. 
74 Id. at 821. 
75 Id. at 821-22. 
76 Id. at 822. 
77 Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1123 (D. Nev. 2006). 
78 Located online at www.google.com. 
79 See WIKIPEDIA ONLINE DICTIONARY, “Web crawler,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_crawler (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
80 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. 
81 Id. 
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search, links to the cached copy of the websites are returned in the index 
alongside the full URL for the original page.  By clicking on the cached link 
rather than the original URL, the user views an archival copy of the 
webpage, “as it appeared the last time the site was visited and analyzed by 
the [web crawler].”82  When a cached page is displayed, a large disclaimer 
explains that the user is not at the original website and two hyperlinks lead 
to the original website.  Other major search engines, including Yahoo! and 
MSN, also feature cached links.  Although Google has provided its cache 
since 1998, this was the first suit stemming from their inclusion.83 
¶27 As the court noted, Google’s web crawling is an automated 
process.84  Inevitably, in scouring the Internet, the search engine will 
analyze copyrighted content placed on websites, and through the cache 
process, save a copy of this content to Google’s servers.  The Nevada 
District Court stated “[g]iven the breadth of the Internet, it is not possible 
for Google (or other search engines) to personally contact every Web site 
owner to determine whether the owner wants the pages in its site listed in 
search results or accessible through ‘Cached’ links.”85  To allow content 
owners to control both whether their websites are analyzed by the search 
engine and whether an archived cache copy is stored, the Internet industry 
“developed a set of widely recognized and well-publicized industry 
standard protocols by which Web site owners can automatically 
communicate their preferences to search engines such as Google.”86  
Through a relatively easy and short process (“a matter of seconds”) a 
website manager can place specific instruction in either the website’s meta-
tags, or in a “robot.txt” file, which give instructions to either prevent 
archival cached copies from being generated, or prevent the search engine 
from indexing the website at all.87  Further, a website owner can also make 
requests directly to Google, following step-by-step instructions through an 
online process.88 
¶28 Plaintiff Blake Field, a recent law school graduate, posted fifty-one 
copyrighted works on his website freely accessible to the public.89  Field 
“created a robots.txt file for his site, and set the permissions . . . to allow all 
robots to visit and index all of the pages on the site.”90  Further, although 
                                                     
82 Id. at 1110-11. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1110. 
85 Id. at 1112. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1112-13. 
88 Id. at 1113 n.5. 
89 Id. at 1114 (works posted on Blake A. Field, www.blakeswritings.com (last 
visited April 10, 2006)). 
90 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. 
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Field was aware of the “no-archive” meta-tag process, he consciously chose 
not to use the “no-archive” meta-tag on his website, presumably to allow 
the Google search engine to create cached copies.91  The Google web-
crawler did just this, and once the cached links had been selected by other 
users (technically constituting a “display” for copyright purposes), Field 
filed a complaint for direct copyright infringement,92 seeking statutory 
damages in the amount of $50,000 for each of the fifty-one copyrighted 
works.93 
¶29 Google moved for summary judgment based, among other defenses, 
on fair use.94  The district court granted all motions in favor of Google and 
dismissed Blake’s case on summary judgment.95 
2. Fair-Use Defense of Google’s Cache 
¶30 Applying the fair-use analysis established by the four Section 107 
factors, the Nevada District Court first looked to the purpose and character 
of Google’s use and found that, while Google did have a commercial 
purpose, its use was transformative in nature, thus weighing heavily in favor 
of fair use.96  Regarding Google’s commercial nature, the court noted: 
While Google is a for-profit corporation, there is no evidence Google 
profited in any way by the use of any of Field’s works.  Rather, Field’s 
works were among billions of works in Google’s database. . . . 
Moreover, when a user accesses a page via Google’s “Cached” links, 
Google displays no advertising to the user, and does not otherwise 
offer a commercial transaction to the user.97
¶31 Assessing Google’s cache’s transformative nature, the court first 
focused on several “socially important” uses of the cache for the public 
benefit, including allowing access when the original page is inaccessible, 
allowing users to detect changes made to the particular web page over time, 
and allowing users to understand why a page was responsive to their 
                                                     
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1113-14. 
93 Id. at 1110. 
94.Id.  Google also moved for summary judgment based upon a lack of direct 
infringement, implied license, estoppel, the safe harbor provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Section 512 (a)–(d) (2000).  Id.  While the 
lack of volitional conduct may make the fair use defense dicta, the fair use 
holding remains helpful to Google’s defense of its Library Project.  See, e.g., 
Fred von Lohmann, Nevada Court Rules Google Cache Is Fair Use, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, January 25, 2006, 
http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2006_01.php#004345
95 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1109-10.   
96 Id. at 1118. 
97 Id. at 1120. 
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original query.98  The court also found that, by including links to the 
original page, the cached version would not substitute for the original, and 
“any user seeking to access the original page has more than ample 
opportunity to do so.”99  Finally, Google’s efforts to ensure that any site 
owner could easily prevent cached copies from being made, and the 
continued permission for cached links by sophisticated website owners, 
further evidenced that Google’s cache was not viewed as a substitute to the 
original web pages.100  These “different and socially important purposes” 
minimized Google’s commercial nature and weighed heavily in favor of fair 
use.101 
¶32 Similar to Kelly II, the Nevada District Court placed little emphasis 
on the second and third factors.  Although Field’s works were creative in 
nature, he had made them widely available on the Internet.102  While the 
content was copied in its entirety through Google’s cache, it was reasonable 
to do so, because Google’s socially valuable purposes “could not be 
effectively accomplished by using only portions of the Web pages.”103 
¶33 Finally, the court found no evidence of any market for Field’s 
works.104  Field’s “circular” claim that Google’s use deprived him of 
potential revenue he could have obtained by licensing Google the right to 
provide cached links for his works was rejected as a “syllogism.”105  
Further, the court found no evidence that a market was likely to develop for 
licensing search engines the right to allow access to web pages through 
cached links.106  This factor thus weighed heavily in favor of fair use.107 
¶34 While the district court’s analysis under the four statutory factors 
seemed sufficiently conclusive for a finding of fair use, the court proceeded 
to consider an additional factor, Google’s good faith, both in operating its 
search engine generally and with Field’s works in particular.108  Google’s 
steps to place control in the hands of the content owners by providing 
several simple methods for preventing cached copies from being created, as 
well as its display of disclaimers and links to the original web pages, 
                                                     
98 Id. at 1118-19 (“The Internet is replete with references from academics, 
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99 Id. at 1119. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1119-20. 
102 Id. at 1120. 
103 Id. at 1121. 
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105 Id. at 1121 n.9. 
106 Id. at 1121-22. 
107 Id. at 1122. 
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showed good faith in operating its search engine’s cache procedure.109  
Further, when notified of Field’s lawsuit, Google promptly removed cached 
links to Field’s pages without being asked.110  Finally, the court juxtaposed 
Google’s good faith with Field’s conduct and noted that the two stood “in 
marked contrast”111 because Field “decided to manufacture a claim for 
copyright infringement . . . in the hopes of making money from Google’s 
standard practice.”112 
C. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc. 
¶35 In Perfect 10, the Central District of California held that, despite its 
similarity to the search engine in Kelly II, Google’s display of thumbnail 
versions of copyrighted images likely did not qualify as fair use.113  
1. Google Image Search 
¶36 Google Image Search114 is an online search engine that operates, at 
a general level, very similarly to the Arriba Soft system in Kelly II.115  In 
response to text queries, the search engine generates and returns an index of 
relevant thumbnail images.116  To generate these indexes, the thumbnails 
are stored in Google’s cache memory.117  The same methods of preventing 
web crawler access that apply in Google’s text-based search engine118 are 
also available for the Image Search.119  When the user selects a thumbnail 
within the results index, the original website, featuring the original image in 
its full-size, is incorporated into a web browser window through in-line 
linking a process Google calls “framing.”120  The full-size image is not 
stored in the cache, only the in-line link or other HTML code.121 
¶37 Google derives significant revenue from its AdSense advertising 
program.  AdSense “allows pages on third party sites to carry Google-
sponsored advertising and share with Google the revenue that flows from 
the advertising displays and click-throughs.”122  Website owners place code 
                                                     
109 Id. at 1122. 
110 Id. at 1122-23. 
111 Id. at 1123. 
112 Id. at 1113. 
113 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 851 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
114 Located Online at http://images.google.com.  
115 See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
116 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 832-33. 
117 Id. at 833. 
118 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
119 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
120 Id. at 833. 
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122 Id. at 834 (internal quotations omitted). 
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on their sites asking Google’s server to select relevant advertisements to 
place on the webpages based on the sites’ content, and revenue is divided 
between the website owners and Google.123 
¶38 Perfect 10—a content provider of “high-quality, nude photographs 
of ‘natural’ models,” operating both an adult magazine and a subscription 
website124—generates revenue from its copyrighted works in three formats; 
magazines, website subscriptions, and licensing agreements with Fonestarz 
Media Limited for reduced-size images for download and use on cell 
phones.125  Perfect 10 entered into its licensing agreement with Fonestarz in 
early 2005, after commencing litigation against Google.126 
¶39 Many of Perfect 10’s copyrighted images have been displayed 
without authorization on other third-party websites.127  These third-party 
websites are indexed when a relevant Google Image Search is run, and 
thumbnails are generated and stored on Google’s servers.128   
2. Thumbnail Fair-Use Analysis 
¶40 Perfect 10 brought suit against Google for preliminary injunctive 
relief, claiming direct and contributory infringement by Google for storing 
and displaying thumbnail images.129  Most important to the Google Library 
                                                     
123 Id.;  see, generally, AdSense Help Center, 
http://www.google.com/support/adsense/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
124 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 831-32.  For more information on Perfect 10’s 
extensive participation in Internet litigation, see Peter J. Pizzi, Perfect 10 v. 
Google, Adult Web Site Challenges Search Engine On Image Hits, NEW YORK 
L.J., Volume 233-No.2 (Jan. 4, 2005). 
125 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 838. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 838.  The district court first decided the question, left unanswered in 
Kelly II, as to what constituted a display with respect to in-line linking.  The 
court presented two approaches, the “server” test (where display is only 
demonstrated if the image is stored on the defendant’s server and sent to the 
user), and the “incorporation” test (where display can be demonstrated by “the 
mere act of incorporating content into a webpage,” i.e. in-line linking).  Id. at 
838-39.  Sensitive to the broad liability the incorporation test could create, id., 
the ease and logic of application of the server test, id. at 843, and noting the 
heavy criticism and subsequent withdrawal of the Ninth Circuit’s Kelly I 
opinion, id. at 841-42, the district court adopted the server test, and found that 
Google’s framing and in-line linking of the full-size images from third-party 
websites did not constitute a display for direct copyright infringement, id. at 
843-44.  As Google did store the thumbnail images on its server, transmission of 
these images to the Image Search user did constitute a display.  Id. at 844. 
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litigation, the court held in favor of Perfect 10’s claim that Google’s display 
of the thumbnail images was infringing and likely not a fair use. 
¶41 The court first found that Google’s use was more commercial than 
that in Kelly II.  The commercial benefit garnered from drawing increased 
web traffic would ordinarily fall within Kelly II’s category of “more 
incidental and less exploitative in nature than more traditional types of 
commercial use.”130  However, unlike Arriba, Google Image Search offers 
and derives a commercial benefit from the AdSense program.  By directing 
users, through thumbnail indexes, to third-party websites that carry 
infringing copies of Perfect 10’s copyrighted images, “Google’s thumbnails 
lead users to sites that directly benefit Google’s bottom line.”131 
¶42 The court also found Google’s thumbnail images to be both 
transformative and consumptive under the first fair use factor.132  The 
thumbnails served different purposes from, and did not supersede, the 
original full-sized images, qualifying as transformative under Kelly II.133  
Yet the thumbnail images were consumptive as to the reduced-size images 
that Perfect 10 licensed to Fonestarz.134  The thumbnails were “essentially 
the same size and of the same quality” and could supersede the images 
licensed to Fonestarz.135 
¶43 The second and third factors were analyzed similarly to Kelly II, 
leading to the same results, with these factors having little influence on the 
fair use determination.136 
¶44 The fourth Section 107 factor also weighed slightly in favor of 
Perfect 10.  While Google’s thumbnail images would not affect any market 
for the full-size originals, the court found the thumbnails likely would harm 
the potential market for downloading of Perfect 10’s images onto cell 
phones.137  Although Google argued that, because the cell phone image 
download market was growing, its generation of thumbnails must not be 
having a negative impact, the court countered that the market “may have 
grown even faster but for the fact that mobile users . . . can download the 
Google thumbnails at no cost.”138 
¶45 Due primarily to the commercial purpose and dual transformative-
consumptive nature of Google’s thumbnails, as well as potential for harm in 
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133 See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
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the cell phone image-download market, the district court held Google’s use 
of thumbnail images likely did not constitute fair use and issued an 
injunction in Perfect 10’s favor.139  The court reached this conclusion: 
[D]espite the enormous public benefit that search engines such as 
Google provide.  Although the Court is reluctant to issue a ruling that 
might impede the advance of Internet technology, and although it is 
appropriate . . . to consider the immense value to the public of such 
technologies, existing judicial precedents do not allow such 
considerations to trump a reasoned analysis of the four fair use 
factors.140
¶46 Sensitive to the potential for imposing broad liability for the 
socially valuable Image Search, the court ordered the parties to negotiate 
terms that would be “carefully tailored to balance the competing interests 
. . . of intellectual property rights on the one hand and those promoting 
access to information on the other.”141 
IV. APPLICATION OF NEW NINTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS TO THE 
GOOGLE LIBRARY PROJECT 
¶47 The Ninth Circuit’s Kelly II142  decision is compelling, though non-
binding, precedent in the Library Project litigation.  However, several points 
from Field143 and Perfect 10144 can be applied to the Google Library 
Project, both developing and limiting the Kelly II’s precedent regarding the 
first and fourth factors of the fair-use analysis. 
A. The Clear Relevance of the Kelly II Case. 
¶48 The facts and analysis of Kelly II lend well to the Google Library 
Project.  Google’s use of the original works is commercial but arguably 
“more incidental and less exploitative in nature.”145  The display of snippets 
for locating materials relevant to search queries is different than the purpose 
and function of the original books, and the Library Project’s information-
gathering function, and enormous potential for research purposes, clearly 
presents a public benefit.   
                                                     
139 Id. 
140 Id; see also id. at 859 (“Google argues that the ‘value of facilitating and 
improving access to information on the Internet . . . counsels against an 
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served when the rights of copyright holders are protected.”). 
141 Id. at 859. 
142 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Kelly II”). 
143 Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
144 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
145 Kelly II, 336 F.3d at 818. 
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¶49 Although many of the books Google copies are creative, they have 
all been published (although not necessarily online) and thus do not impinge 
on the author’s right of first publication.146  Google copies the works in full, 
yet such wholesale copying is necessary to create a functional search 
engine.  Finally, while it is arguable whether the content-owners of library 
books may lose the licensing value of their works due to Google’s actions, 
the search-engine is not created to replace demand for full books and is 
designed to lead users to locations for purchasing the original works.147 
B. Transformative Uses and the Public’s Benefit 
¶50 Both the Field and Perfect 10 courts recognize the great public 
benefits search engines provide.  The public benefit is frequently considered 
within the first Section 107 factor, essentially making a transformative 
publicly beneficial use stronger than a transformative personal use.  The 
evidence of the Google Library Project’s public benefit is without question, 
particularly considering the recent legislative focus on orphan works148,and 
the Library Project’s potential to revive printed literature.  This may 
counteract any additional weight given to Google’s commercial purpose. 
¶51 However, the Perfect 10 court ruled against a finding of fair use 
“despite the enormous public benefit that search engines . . . provide.”149  
The Central District of California refused to simply allow a great public 
benefit to be determinative, even when finding the statutory fair use factors 
weighed only “slightly in favor” of the plaintiff:  “although it is appropriate 
for courts to consider the immense value to the public of such technologies, 
                                                     
146 See Harper & Row Publishers, supra note 68, at 564 (“While even substantial 
quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a news 
account of a speech that had been delivered to the public or disseminated to the 
press, . . . the author’s right to control the first public appearance of his 
expression weighs against such use of the work before its release.  The right of 
first publication encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at all, but 
also the choices of when, where, and in what form first to publish a work.”) 
147 The above description regarding Kelly II’s application to the Google Library 
Project is admittedly oversimplified, as the focus of this iBrief is on the new 
developments in the Ninth Circuit.  For a thorough analysis of this application, 
see BAND, supra note 13, at 5-9. 
148 “Orphan works” is a term generally used to describe “the situation where the 
owner of a copyrighted work cannot be identified and located by someone who 
wishes to make use of the work in a manner that requires permission of the 
copyright owner.”  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT, REPORT 
ON ORPHAN WORKS 1 (Jan. 2006), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 
2007). 
149 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851. 
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existing judicial precedents do not allow such considerations to trump a 
reasoned analysis of the four fair use factors.”150 
C. Field May Give Weight to Google Library’s “Opt-Out” Provision 
¶52 The Field court’s emphasis on Google’s widely published and 
relatively simple methods for preventing its search engine from indexing 
and caching website content, as well as honoring requests from content 
owners, may be viewed as an endorsement of an opt-out provision within 
fair-use analysis.  The court found that the methods provided sufficient 
limitations for “site owners, and not Google, [to] control whether ‘Cached’ 
links will appear for their pages.”151 
¶53 The Perfect 10 court did not lend much credence to this line of 
thought.  However, while Field could easily prevent all unauthorized use of 
his works, Perfect 10 could not because the works were being indexed from 
third-party websites.152  Pragmatic concerns also may make providing an 
“opt-out” method influential, particularly in an information-gathering 
context where, as the Field court found, “it is not possible . . . to personally 
contact every [content] owner” to obtain permission.153  This analysis is 
certainly relevant concerning orphan works, a particularly sensitive interest 
in copyright policy. 
¶54 As in Field, these considerations may fall under the transformative 
nature analysis of the first fair-use factor, or, alternatively, within 
consideration of good faith.  Certainly, providing an “opt-out” method alone 
would not immunize a defendant from copyright infringement claims.  
However, volunteering a relatively simple and effective method for content 
owners to prevent their works from being included in a vast project may 
lessen the image of authors’ works being wrestled from their grasp.  
Additionally, Google’s allowance for content owners to transfer their works 
into the Member Program154 could weigh against a finding of a 
consumptive use.  The analysis could be given comparative value to the 
published status of a work, which neutralizes the weight of the works’ 
creative nature in the second fair-use factor.155 
¶55 If Google’s “opt-out” offer, and temporary suspension of copying, 
is instead seen simply as a consideration of good faith, it will likely have 
little impact on the Southern District of New York’s analysis.  In 2004, the 
Second Circuit marginalized the weight given in fair-use cases to the good 
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faith of the alleged infringer.156  The different treatment accorded to good 
faith by the Second and Ninth Circuits would likely preclude from the 
Google Library Project litigation such substantial consideration as was 
given by the Field court. 
D. New Yardsticks for Kelly’s Commercialism and Market Effects 
Analyses 
¶56 Both the Field and Perfect 10 technologies share common factors 
with the Library Project’s commercial nature.  The Field case featured a 
“more incidental and less exploitative” commercial purpose, similar to that 
in Kelly II.157  The Field court noted that “no advertising was displayed to 
the user [when viewing the cached links],”158 which is also true of the 
Library Project’s display of Book Search results.159 
¶57 However, the Field court also noted that Google “does not 
otherwise offer a commercial transaction to the user.”160  While perhaps 
true at the outset of the Library Project, Google has recently announced its 
program allowing users to sign in and purchase browser-based access 
books, in a joint venture with publishers.161  Although the relationship 
between the Library Project and these new online sales is not yet clear, this 
may push the commercial purpose of Google’s books search beyond Kelly 
II’s “incidental” category. 
¶58 In Perfect 10, it is arguable whether the financial benefit of 
AdSense corresponded as directly with the thumbnail images generated 
from infringing websites as the court found.162  However, this shows that 
any benefit more direct than merely increased traffic can add weight to the 
commercial nature of the use.  Google’s Book Search could likely be the 
most complete online book search index, due largely to the Library 
Project’s ability to bypass the inefficient and often futile search for content 
owners.  The tie between Google’s draw of readers to its Book Search, in 
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part resulting from the alleged infringing use, and direct financial benefits 
from the new business model offering online transactions brokered by 
Google, could shift the Library Project into Perfect 10’s realm of 
somewhere beyond “incidental and less exploitative” use. 
¶59 Perfect 10’s licensing agreement with Fonestarz shows that, despite 
a highly transformative use, even a licensing potential that develops 
subsequent to commencing litigation can weigh against the fair use of an 
established business practice and information-gathering system.163  If the 
content owners in the Google Library litigation subsequently develop a 
market for licensing the display of “snippets,” or even if the court finds 
likely a potential for such a market, the market harm factor would likely 
weigh against Google. 
CONCLUSION 
¶60 The debate surrounding the Google Library Project has included 
extensive discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s Kelly v. Arriba Soft164 fair-use 
analysis.  Assuming the Southern District of New York does look to the 
Ninth Circuit’s Kelly II precedent, the Field165 and Perfect 10166 cases 
should guide the analysis further. 
¶61 While copyright is an “opt-in” system, the Field court emphasized 
Google’s affirmative efforts to allow website owners to maintain control 
over their works.167  While this alone would not dictate a finding of fair use, 
it should at least contradict the Publisher’s assertion that Google’s “opt-out” 
procedure turns “every principle of copyright law on its ear.”168  
Consideration of such affirmative efforts by defendants seems particularly 
prudent and logical in cases involving Internet-based technologies, where 
novel fair use determinations are necessary to prevent impeding the 
development of technology.   
¶62 Perfect 10’s findings of what may be defined as a “more than 
incidental” commercial nature, and likelihood of market harm for a newly 
developed licensing market created subsequent to commencing litigation, 
appear doctrinally correct.  However, this shows the peril of entering into a 
large-scale endeavor relying upon a fair-use defense.  Even with a project 
designed around the fair-use standards, the developments and uses for 
technology unforeseen at the project’s initiation can make a previously 
purely transformative use also consumptive and establish market harm.  In 
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the fair-use analysis of such technologies, as in the Library Project 
litigation, a court should give less weight to the subsequently developed 
markets, perhaps allowing for a finding of good faith in the development of 
the technology to mitigate the effect of the market harm. 
¶63 Perfect 10 also shows that, regardless of public sentiment and 
industry standard, even a use providing great benefit to the public must be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  The preliminary injunction against 
Google’s Image Search was extremely narrow, limited by the district court 
to terms negotiated between Google and Perfect 10 which would preserve 
the public benefit derived from the technology.169  However, an injunction 
requiring Google to locate and request permission from content owners for 
every resource used in the Library Project would either present preventative 
search costs which would derail the project, or eliminate the benefits above-
and-beyond other book search engines that the project stands poised to 
provide.  Where, as in the Google Library Project, obtaining content 
owner’s permission would be preventatively costly and affirmative steps 
have been taken to allow content owners to maintain control of their works, 
the great public benefit of such a project is an appropriate consideration, 
and should weigh strongly in favor of a finding of fair use. 
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